Chain-component additive games are graph-restricted superadditive games, where an exogenously given line-graph determines the cooperative possibilities of the players. These games can model various multi-agent decision situations, such as strictly hierarchical organisations or sequencing / scheduling related problems, where an order of the agents is fixed by some external factor, and with respect to this order only consecutive coalitions can generate added value.
Introduction
Chain-component additive games were first introduced in [4] . At these superadditive games the cooperative possibilities of the players are restricted by an exogenously given line-graph. In particular, only consecutive coalitions can generate added value. The class of chain-component additive games contains the well-known classes of sequencing games (cf. [3; 6; 8] ) and neighbour games (cf. [7; 10] ). Due to the combinatorial structure of chain-component additive games, and because it covers many interesting classes of games, chain-component additive games are extensively studied in game theory. Non-emptiness of the core is shown in [4] . Furthermore, it is proven in [14] that the core coincides with the bargaining set and that the kernel only consists of the nucleolus. In [17] a primal and in [11] a dual type algorithm is presented for the efficient computation of the nucleolus.
The main focus of this paper is core stability. Core stability combines the well-known concept "core" with the classical solution concept "stable set" proposed in [20] . The core is stable if all non-core members of the imputation set are dominated by a core element. In general, the existence (cf. [13] ) and uniqueness of stable sets is not guaranteed. However, if the core is stable, then it is the unique stable set. A class of games that satisfies core stability is that of convex games (cf. [15] ). Apart from the result on convex games, only few results are known with respect to core stability. These results include a characterisation of core stability for symmetric games (cf. [2] ) and a characterisation for assignment games in terms of the underlying matrix (cf. [18] ). We characterise core stability for chain-component additive games by introducing covering families.
These covering families give rise to (in the number of players) polynomially many linear equalities and inequalities. We show the necessity of these linear equalities and inequalities using a dual approach. First we appoint a certain subset of the imputation set and we show, using a variant of Farkas' Lemma, that this subset contains an undominated imputation outside the core if and only if all vectors from a related polyhedron satisfy a well-chosen linear inequality. We then decompose each member of this polyhedron into a sum of three types of basis vectors. Finally we use these basis vectors to show that the well-chosen linear inequality is indeed satisfied for each member of the polyhedron.
In this paper we also investigate largeness of the core, as well as extendibility and exactness of the game. Largeness is the property that the lower boundary of the upper core coincides with the core. A game is called extendible if each core element of each subgame can be extended to a core element of the game. Finally, if a game is exact, then for every coalition there exists a core element that allocates its value to its members. In [16] it is proven that largeness of the core is a sufficient condition for core stability. In [9] extendibility of the game is shown to be necessary for largeness and sufficient for core stability. Extendibility had been conjectured to be equivalent to core stability, but in [19] a counter-example was given. We will show for chain-component additive games that largeness, extendibility and exactness are equivalent. Moreover, we characterise these concepts in terms of linear inequalities arising from the combinatorial structure of the game.
Finally, we refine the concept of extendibility in the following way. We call a game essential extendibility if each core element of each subgame corresponding to an essential coalition can be extended to a core element of the game. We show that essential extendibility is equivalent to core stability for chain-component additive games.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall some concepts from cooperative game theory and in Section 3 we state and prove our main results. In the Appendix we state and prove some technical lemmas.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall some concepts from cooperative game theory and we introduce chaincomponent additive games.
A cooperative TU-game (N, v) consists of a finite player set N = {1, . . . , n} and a map v : 2 N → R that expresses the worth of each coalition. By convention, v(∅) = 0. A game (N, v) is called superadditive if for each S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ). Coalition S ⊆ N is called essential if for each partition P of S it holds that T ∈P v(T ) < v(S). A coalition that is not essential is said to be inessential. For each T ⊆ N , the subgame (T, v T ) is the game with player set T and v T (S) = v(S) for each S ⊆ T . The imputation set I(v) = {x ∈ R N : i∈N x i = v(N ), x i ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N } is the set of efficient payoff vectors respecting the worth each player can obtain on its own. The upper core U (v) = {x ∈ R N : i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N } is the set of payoff vectors at which each coalition is satisfied. The core C(v) = {x ∈ R N : i∈N x i = v(N ), i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N } is the set of efficient payoff vectors in the upper core. If a core element is proposed as a payoff vector, then no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Note that the core of a game can be empty. Games with a non-empty core are called balanced. If for a balanced game each subgame is also balanced, then the game is said to be totally balanced. An order on the player set is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N . Let σ be an order on the player set. 1] such that λ(S) > 0 for each S ∈ B and S∈B λ(S)e(S) = e(N ), where e j (S) = 1 if j ∈ S and e j (S) = 0 otherwise. Let x, y ∈ I(v). Now x is said to dominate y via coalition S ⊆ N if i∈S x i ≤ v(S) and x i > y i for all i ∈ S. The core is called stable if for each imputation y outside the core there is a core element x and a coalition S ⊆ N such that x dominates y via S. A game (N, v) is said to be exact if for each S ⊆ N there is an x ∈ C(v) with i∈S x i = v(S). The core is said to be large if for each x ∈ U (v) there is a y ∈ C(v) with y i ≤ x i for each i ∈ N . Finally, a game is said to be extendible if each core element of each subgame can be extended to a core element of (N, v). In other words, the game is extendible if for each
In [16] it is shown that largeness of the core is a sufficient condition for core stability. It was proven in [9] that extendibility is necessary for largeness of the core and sufficient for core stability. For totally balanced games it is shown in [16] that exactness is implied by largeness. Moreover, in [1] it is shown for totally balanced games that exactness is necessary for extendibility. In general, exactness and core stability do not imply one another (cf. [1; 19] ).
Finally we introduce chain-component additive games. Let σ 0 : {1, . . . , n} → N be a bijective map. Coalition S ⊆ N is said to be connected with respect to σ 0 if for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n with σ 0 (i), σ 0 (j) ∈ S it holds that σ 0 (k) ∈ S for all i ≤ k ≤ j. For coalition T ⊆ N , let T \σ 0 denote the partition of T into maximally connected components. A game (N, v) is a chain-component additive game, with respect to σ 0 , if it is superadditive and if v(T ) = S∈T \σ 0 v(S) for each T ⊆ N . That is, the worth of a coalition is equal to the sum of the worths of its connected parts. Note that disconnected coalitions are inessential. It is shown in [4] that chain-component additive games are balanced. Obviously this implies that chain-component additive games are totally balanced as well, since subgames inherit the chain-component additive structure.
In the remainder of this paper we assume without loss of generality that σ 0 (i) = i for each i ∈ N . Let S be the set of connected coalitions with respect to σ 0 . It will be convenient to write (with a little abuse of notation) a connected coalition S ∈ S as an (ordered) set of players S = {s 1 , . . . , s 2 } with the convention that s 1 = min S and s 2 = max S. Note that for chaincomponent additive games both the upper core and the core are completely determined by the connected coalitions, i.e., U (v) = {x ∈ R N : i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ S} and C(v) = {x ∈ R N :
Core stability of chain-component additive games
In this section we state and prove our main results. First we show that for chain-component additive games a large class of marginal vectors are core elements. Then we show that largeness, extendibility and exactness are all equivalent. Furthermore we will characterise these concepts in terms of inequalities. Subsequently we introduce a refinement of extendibility, called essential extendibility, and show that is equivalent to core stability for chain-component additive games.
As a final result we will characterise core stability and essential extendibility in terms of (in the number of players) polynomially many linear equalities and inequalities.
The following theorem shows that a large class of marginal vectors are core elements. In particular, if an order σ : {1, . . . , n} → N is such that N \{σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} is connected with respect to σ 0 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ n, then the corresponding marginal vector m σ (v) is a core element.
Proof: Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → N be such that N \{σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} is connected with respect to σ 0 for each 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Because of the definition of σ and the chain-component additivity of (
Since m σ (v) is efficient by definition, we only need to show that for all S ∈ S it holds that j∈S m σ j (v) ≥ v(S). Let S ∈ S and write S = {s 1 , . . . , s 2 }. First assume that σ(n) ∈ S. Then either s 2 < σ(n) or s 1 > σ(n). Without loss of generality assume that s 2 < σ(n). It holds that
where the inequality follows from superadditivity. Now assume that σ(n) ∈ S. Observe that
where again the inequality follows because of superadditivity. 2
Note that from Theorem 3.1 it follows that m σ (v), m τ (v) ∈ C(v) with σ and τ such that σ(i) = i, τ (i) = n + 1 − i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is also indirectly proven in [4] .
In the upcoming part of this section we will characterise largeness, extendibility and exactness in terms of inequalities. In order to do so we introduce covering families. We call an ordered set
Requirement (P1) states that every player is contained in least one element of a covering family, and (P2) states that two subsequent elements of a covering family should not be disjoint. Notice that (P3) is equivalent to stating that each proper subset of a covering family is not a covering family itself. The following example illustrates the concept of covering families. Observe that an m-covering family could equivalently be described by the alternating sequence of the 2m − 1 nonempty blocks of consecutive players who are covered by exactly one or exactly two family-member coalitions. It follows that in an n-player chain-component additive game the number of different m-covering families is n−1 2m−2 , provided, of course, that 2m − 1 ≤ n. With each m-covering family T = {T 1 , . . . , T m } we will associate a corresponding covering family inequality:
The following theorem characterises largeness, extendibility and exactness in terms of covering family inequalities. Proof: We will show 1 ⇒ 2 and 4 ⇒ 1. The proof of 2 ⇒ 3 follows from [9] and 3 ⇒ 4 is shown in [1] , since chain-component additive games are totally balanced.
First we show that if for each covering family the corresponding inequality is satisfied, then the core is large. Assume that (N, v) is such that the inequalities corresponding to the covering families hold. Let x ∈ U (v). If x ∈ C(v), i.e. if i∈N x i = v(N ), then we are done, so assume that i∈N x i > v(N ). We need to show the existence of a y ∈ C(v) with y i ≤ x i for each i ∈ N . Instead, we will show the existence of an x 1 ∈ U (v) with x 1 j < x j for some j ∈ N and
We will then argue that in a finite number of steps we can recursively find an
Define S(x) = {S ∈ S : i∈S x i = v(S)} to be the set of connected coalitions which are tight at x. We first show, by contradiction, that there is a j ∈ N such that j ∈ T for all T ∈ S(x). Suppose that for all j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T . According to Lemma A.2 S(x) contains at least one covering family. Let {T 1 , . . . , T m } be such a covering family. Since
The first inequality holds because {T 1 , . . . , T m } is a covering family, and by our assumption, the corresponding inequality is satisfied. The strict inequality holds because we have assumed that j∈N x j > v(N ). The last inequality holds because x ∈ U (v), and therefore
However, since {T 1 , . . . , T m } is a covering family, 1≤i≤m j∈T i x j = j∈N x j + 1≤i≤m−1 j∈T i ∩T i+1 x j , which contradicts (1) . We conclude that it cannot hold that for every
Also note that S(x) S(x 1 ) since all coalitions that are tight at x are also tight at x 1 , while at x 1 at least one more coalition is tight.
If j∈N x 1 j = v(N ), then we are done. If j∈N x 1 j > v(N ), we can apply the same procedure to find an element
Observe that, by definition of , S(x) S(x 1 ) . . . S(x p ). Since the set of players not covered by the families S(x) S(x 1 ) . . . S(x p ) is strictly shrinking, it follows that we construct an x p ∈ C(v) with x p ≤ x in p ≤ n steps. Hence, the core of the game is large.
The second and final statement we need to show is that if the game is exact, then the inequalities corresponding to covering families hold. Assume that the game is exact and let {T 1 , . . . , T m } be a covering family. Since the game is exact, there is an
, where the last equality holds because of (P3) and because of the chain-component additive nature of (N, v). Since x ∈ C(v) it holds that
We conclude that the inequality corresponding to covering family {T 1 , . . . , T m } is satisfied.
2
Observe that for an n-player chain component additive game our characterisation requires the checking of
In the final part of this section we will investigate core stability of chain-component additive games.
Of course, if the condition of Theorem 3.2 is satisfied, then it easily follows that the core is stable. However, this condition is too strong. We will obtain polynomially many linear equalities and inequalities arising from 2− and 3-covering families that characterise core stability. Furthermore we prove that core stability for chain-component additive games is equivalent to essential extendibility.
Note that if a game is extendible, then it is essential extendible. The following proposition shows that for each T U -game essential extendibility is a sufficient condition for core stability.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, v) be essential extendible. Then its core is stable.
Proof: For core stability we need to show that each imputation outside the core is dominated by a core element. Let x ∈ I(v)\C(v). Let S ⊆ N be a smallest coalition that is not satisfied at imputation x. In other words, S is such that i∈S x i < v(S) and for all T ⊆ S, T = S, it holds that i∈T x i ≥ v(T ). Now observe that S is essential. Indeed, if S is not essential, then there is a partition P of S with T ∈P v(T ) ≥ v(S), implying that one of the coalitions in P is not satisfied at x as well.
We now approach the main theorem of this paper. In the proof of this theorem we apply a variant of Farkas' Lemma, proven in [5] . Note that we abuse notation by omitting all transpose signs.
It holds for all x ∈ P that cx ≤ δ if and only if there exists a y ∈ R m + with yA = c and yb ≤ δ.
We are now ready to state and prove our main result. 3. The core of (N, v) is stable.
Proof: We first show 1 ⇒ 2. So assume that all 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied. Furthermore assume for each 3-covering family {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 } with essential T 2 that the corresponding inequality is satisfied. We need to show that (N, v) is essential extendible, so let S ⊆ N be essential. Now note that if {T 1 , S, T 3 } is a 3-covering family, then the corresponding inequality is satisfied by assumption. Let x ∈ C(v S ). We will construct a y ∈ C(v) with y i = x i for each i ∈ S. First we make some agreements on notation. Since S ∈ S and S = N it holds that N \S consists of at least one and at most two components. For simplicity, let S 1 , . . . , S m denote these components (so m = 1 or m = 2).
We first show that y ∈ U (v). Secondly we show that y is efficient and thus that y ∈ C(v). Observe that i∈T y i = i∈T x i ≥ v(T ) for each T ⊆ S. By definition of y sm it holds that y sm + k∈T \{sm} y k ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ S with s m ∈ T . Furthermore, in case of m = 2 by definition of y s 1 we also have that y s 1 + k∈T \{s 1 } y k ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ S with s 2 ∈ T and s 1 ∈ T . For T ⊆ S, T ∈ S we note that i∈T y i > i∈T x i ≥ v(T ). Finally, let T ⊆ S i \{s i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and T ∈ S. It follows from Theorem 3.1 applied to the subgame (S i \{s i }, v S i \{s i } ) and our choice of σ i that k∈T y k ≥ v(T ). We conclude that y ∈ U (v).
It remains to show that i∈N y i ≤ v(N ), since by definition of y sm it holds that i∈N
Under this assumption the following three properties hold for R i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
We will only show (Q1), the other two properties are immediate from the assumed maximality of R i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If m = 1 there is nothing to prove, so assume that m = 2. Suppose
The inequality comes from superadditivity. We have now obtained that R 1 ∪ R 2 = argmax{v(T ) − k∈T \{l} y k : T ⊆ S ∪ 1≤q≤2 S q }, and this clearly contradicts our assumption that R 2 is maximal with respect to inclusion. We conclude that (Q1) holds.
We now distinguish between two possibilities.
The second equality holds by definition of R 1 and R 2 . The first inequality is satisfied because
The last inequality is satisfied because {R 1 , R 2 } is a 2-covering family and we assumed that 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied.
The second equality holds by definition of y and R 1 . The first inequality because j∈T y j ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ S. The second inequality is satisfied because R 1 and S form a 2-covering family and we assumed that 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied.
If m = 2, then it follows from
Because of (Q3) we have that R 1 ∩ S = ∅ and S ∩ R 2 = ∅. Therefore {R 1 , S, R 2 } forms a 3-covering family. We conclude that
Again, the second equality holds by definition of R 1 , R 2 and y. The first inequality because j∈T y j ≥ v(T ) for each T ∈ S and the second because the inequality corresponding to the 3covering family {R 1 , S, R 2 } is satisfied. This concludes the proof of 1 ⇒ 2.
It remains to show 3 ⇒ 1, since 2 ⇒ 3 follows from Proposition 3.1. We first show that the inequalities corresponding to 2-covering families are necessary. We then proceed with the necessity of the condition involving 3-covering families.
Suppose that that the inequality corresponding to the 2-covering family {T 1 , T 2 } is not satisfied. In other words, suppose that v(T 1 ) + v(T 2 ) > v(N ) + v(T 1 ∩ T 2 ). We will show that the core is not stable by constructing a non-core imputation that cannot be dominated by any core element.
Let t * be such that T 1 = {1, . . . , t * }, and consider the order σ : {1, . . . , n} → N with σ(i) = t * + 1 − i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t * } and σ(i) = n + t * + 1 − i for each i ∈ {t * + 1, . . . , n}. It holds that
, where the inequality follows by assumption. Thus, m σ (v) ∈ C(v). Furthermore, from Theorem 3.1 and the choice of σ it follows straightforwardly that i∈S m σ i (v) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N \{t * + 1}. Therefore m σ (v) can only be dominated via coalitions that contain player t * + 1. However, at m σ (v) player t * + 1 receives a payoff of
. We therefore conclude that m σ (v) cannot be dominated by a core element via a coalition containing player t * + 1. This implies that m σ (v) cannot be dominated by any core element. So the core is not stable. Consequently, the inequalities arising from 2-covering families are necessary for core stability.
We now show that the conditions for 3-covering families are necessary. Suppose that the inequalities corresponding to 2-covering families are satisfied. Furthermore suppose that for the 3-covering family {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 } the corresponding condition is not satisfied, i.e. suppose that v(
Again, we show that the core is not stable by showing the existence of a non-core imputation that can not be dominated by any core element. Before we actually start the proof, we first introduce some notation.
Define T * = N \(T 1 ∪ T 3 ) and T = {T ∈ S : T * ⊆ T }. So T is the set of connected coalitions not containing T * . Define P by
Firstly we show that P = ∅ and that P ⊆ I(v). Secondly we show, by applying Lemma 3.1, the existence of an x ∈ P \C(v) that cannot be dominated by any core element. This implies the necessity of the condition involving 3-covering families.
Let
. We conclude that m σ (v) ∈ P , and thus that P = ∅. Next we show that P ⊆ I(v). Let x ∈ P . We need to show that i∈N x i = v(N ) and
. By definition of P it holds that i∈N x i ≤ v(N ). So we conclude that i∈N x i = v(N ). Because {i} ∈ T for each i ∈ T * it holds that x i ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ T * . If |T * | > 1, then it also holds that {i} ∈ T for all i ∈ T * . So in this case we have that x i ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . If |T * | = 1, then T * = {i} for some i ∈ N , and consequently we have that {i} ∈ T . However, observe that
where the first inequality follows since x ∈ P and the second by superadditivity. So if |T * | = 1, it also holds that x i ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . We conclude that P ⊆ I(v).
It remains to show the existence of an x ∈ P \C(v) that cannot be dominated by any core element. In order to do so, define a matrix A and a vector b such that x ∈ P if and only if Ax ≤ b. So for each T ∈ T ∪ {T * } there is a corresponding row −e(T ) in A and for coalition N there is a row e(N ) in A.
Since P is nonempty it holds that Ax ≤ b has a solution. So we can apply Lemma 3.1, with c = −e(T 2 ) and δ = −v(T 2 ), to conclude that for all x ∈ P it holds that −e(T 2 )x = − i∈T 2 x i ≤ −v(T 2 ) if and only if there is a y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T 2 ) and yb ≤ −v(T 2 ). However, we will show that for all y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T 2 ) it holds that yb > −v(T 2 ). This means there is an x ∈ P with − i∈T 2 x i > −v(T 2 ). Hence, i∈T 2 x i < v(T 2 ) and therefore x ∈ C(v). By definition of P , x can only be dominated by coalitions containing T * . But for every y ∈ C(v) we have that j∈T 1 y j ≥ v(T 1 ), j∈T 3 y j ≥ v(T 3 ) and j∈N y j = v(N ). Consequently,
That is, at x coalition T * receives a payoff that is at least as much as its highest payoff at any core allocation. So x can not be dominated by a core element via a coalition that contains T * . Consequently, the core is not stable. This implies that for core stability the conditions corresponding to 3-covering families are necessary.
It remains to show that for all y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T 2 ) it holds that yb > −v(T 2 ). For each |T ∪ {T * , N }| -dimensional vector u ≥ 0 we write, with abuse of notation, u S instead of u i if the i-th row of A is the row corresponding to coalition S. Define Y(u) = {S ∈ T ∪ {T * , N } : u S > 0} as the set of coalitions that u assigns a positive weight to. Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T 2 ). Instead of calculating yb directly, we first decompose y by using Lemmas A.4, A.5 and A.6. These lemmas are stated and proven in the Appendix. Then we derive the product of these decomposition vectors with b. This enables us to obtain a bound for yb.
According to Lemma A.4 we can decompose y into a 1 k=1 λ k u k + r 1 , with r 1 ≥ 0, r 1 A = −e(T 2 ), Y(r 1 )\{N } contains no partition of N and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 1 it holds that λ k > 0 and u k satisfies (A1). Observe that r 1 satisfies the conditions of Lemma A.5. It follows that r 1 = a 2 k=1 µ k w k + r 2 with r 2 ≥ 0, r 2 N = 0, a 2 k=1 µ k ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 2 it holds that µ k > 0 and w k satisfies (A2). This implies, because r 1 A = −e(T 2 ) and w k A = −e(T 2 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 2 , that r 2 A = (1 − a 2 k=1 µ k )(−e(T 2 )). Note that, since 0 ≤ (1 − a 2 k=1 µ k ) ≤ 1, it follows that r 2 satisfies the condition of Lemma A.6. Therefore we can write r 2 = a 3 k=1 ν k z k with a 3 k=1 ν k = 1 − a 2 k=1 µ k and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 3 it holds that ν k > 0 and z k satisfies (A3).
Concluding, we have y
Here the inequality is satisfied because of superadditivity and because Y(u k )\{N } is a partition of N . Now suppose that T * ∈ Y(u k ). Since Y(u k )\{N } is a partition of N it follows that Y(u k )\{T * , N } consists of a partition A of T 1 and a partition B of T 3 . It follows that
The inequality holds because of superadditivity and because A is a partition of T 1 and B a partition of T 3 . Concluding, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 1 it holds that
Now
We first explain the first inequality. According to Lemma A.9 there is a T ∈V k with T ∩ T 2 = ∅. This implies that {T 1 ∪ T 2 , ∪ T ∈V k T } forms a 2-covering family. Observe that because of Lemma A.9 it holds that (
Since we have assumed that the inequalities corresponding to 2-covering families hold, the first inequality is satisfied. The second inequality holds because of superadditivity and because U k is a partition of T 1 ∪ T 2 . The third and fourth inequalities are satisfied due to superadditivity. Finally we explain the last inequality. According to Lemma A.9 it holds thatV k and V k \V k are both nonempty, and that there is a T ∈V k with T ∩ T 2 = ∅. This means that {∪ S∈V k \V k S, T 2 ∩ (∪ T ∈V k T )} forms a partition of T 2 . Because of our assumption that T 2 is essential the last inequality is satisfied. Now suppose that T * ∈ Y(w k ). Since U k ∩ V k = ∅ it either holds that T * ∈ U k or T * ∈ V k . Without loss of generality assume that T * ∈ U k . Now observe, since U k is a partition of T 1 ∪ T 2 , that U k \{T * } consists of a partition C of T 1 and a partition D of T 2 ∩ T 3 . Therefore
The first inequality holds since we have assumed that the 3-covering family inequality corresponding to {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 } is not satisfied. The second inequality because of superadditivity and because C is a partition of T 1 , D is a partition of T 2 ∩ T 3 and V k is a partition of T 2 ∪ T 3 . The last inequality is satisfied because {T 1 , T 2 ∪ T 3 } forms a 2-covering family with T 1 ∩ (T 2 ∪ T 3 ) = T 1 ∩ T 2 , and because of our assumption that all 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied. Concluding, we have for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 2 that
Finally let 1 ≤ k ≤ a 3 . According to Lemma A.6 it holds that Y(z k ) is a partition of T 2 . Now first suppose that T * ∈ Y(z k ). Then
Here the inequality holds because Y(z k ) is a partition of T 2 , our assumption that T 2 is essential. Now suppose that T * ∈ Y(z k ). Since Y(z k ) is a partition of T 2 , it follows that Y(z k )\{T * } can be split into a partition A of T 1 ∩ T 2 and a partition B of T 2 ∩ T 3 . It holds that
The first inequality follows by superadditivity and the second by our assumption that v(T
Concluding, we have for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 3 that
Summarising we find for yb that
The first inequality holds because of (2). The second inequality holds because of (3) and (4). The last equality is satisfied since a 2 k=1 µ k + a 3 k=1 ν k = 1. 2
The next example illustrates the decomposition lemmas that are used in the proof 3 ⇒ 1 of Theorem 3.3. In particular we decompose a specific y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T 2 ) and show that yb > −v(T 2 ). Observe that yA = S∈T ∪{T * } y S (−e(S)) + y N e(N ) = −e(T 2 ). So we need to show that yb > −v(T 2 ). We will do this by decomposing y. Note that Y(y)\{N } contains a partition of N , for instance U = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}}. Therefore we write y = u 1 + r 1 , with Finally we note that Y(r 2 ) = {{2, 3, 4}, {5, 6}} is a partition of T 2 . Hence, we write r 2 = 1 2 z 1 with
So we have decomposed y into u 1 + 1 2 w 1 + 1 2 z 1 . We will now show that yb = (u 1 + 1 2 w 1 + 1 2 z 1 )b > 0. First note that superadditivity of (N, v) implies
Furthermore it holds that
Here the first inequality is satisfied due to superadditivity. The second holds because the 2-covering family inequality corresponding to {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {5, 6, 7}} is satisfied by assumption. The strict inequality is satisfied by our assumption that T 2 is essential. Finally observe that this assumption also proves that
We conclude that yb = (u 1 + 1
Observe that for an n-player chain component additive game our characterisation of core stability requires the checking of polynomially many linear inequalities and equations. Indeed, there are n−1 2 2-covering and n−1 4 3-covering inequalities, and for each 3-covering inequality that is not satisfied there are at most n − 2 linear equations to consider.
The last theorem we present also deals with core stability and essential extendibility. The condition involving 3-covering families of Theorem 3.3 is slightly strengthened. In particular, for considering core stability and essential extendibility one may take into account a more restricted set of equalities. 3. The core of (N, v) is stable.
Proof: From Theorem 3.3 it follows that 1 ⇒ 2 and Proposition 3.1 shows 2 ⇒ 3. Therefore we only show 3 ⇒ 1.
Assume that the core is stable. From the proof of Theorem 3.3 it follows that each 2-covering family inequality is satisfied. Assume that there is some 3-covering family
We show that this leads to a contradiction.
Assume that
B and A, B ∈ S in the following sense: for each 3-covering family
Since the core is stable, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that T 2 is inessential. Hence, there is a
. Since (N, v) is chain-component additive, we may assume that ∪ k−1 i=1 P i and P k are connected. We conclude there are A, B ∈ S with v(A) + v(B) = v(T 2 ) and {A, B} a partition of T 2 . By assumption, either A ⊆ T 1 ∩ T 2 or B ⊆ T 2 ∩ T 3 . Without loss of generality assume that A ⊆ T 1 ∩ T 2 .
First suppose that A = T 1 ∩ T 2 . Then obviously B = T 2 \T 1 .
Consequently
The first inequality holds because of superadditivity and the second because
is a contradiction to our assumption, we conclude that 
. Note that B ∩ T 3 D and therefore T 2 ∩ T 3 D. Furthermore, since T 1 ∩ B C, we have that T 1 ∩ T 2 (A ∪ C). This contradicts our initial assumption. 2
In this section we show some technical lemmas needed to prove Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3.
where the inequality holds because of superadditivity. Proof: Suppose that for all j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T . We will construct a covering family consisting of elements of S(x). Consider the following algorithm. Let T = {T 1 , . . . , T m } be the set produced by the algorithm. Since for all j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T , it is obvious that, for each j ∈ N , the algorithm selects at least one subset containing j. That is, for all j ∈ N , there is a T i ∈ T with j ∈ T i .
We now show that
Finally, we show that T i ∪ T i+2 ∈ S for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2 by contradiction. Suppose that for
We conclude that {T 1 , . . . , T m } is a covering family.
2.
The following lemma is Proposition 3.1 of [12] . It states that each balanced collection that is a subset of S necessarily contains a partition.
Lemma A. 3 ([12] ) Let B ⊆ S be a balanced collection. Then B contains a partition of N as a subset.
We will now prove the decomposition lemmas needed for the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Lemma A.4 Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T 2 ). We can decompose y into a 1 k=1 λ k u k + r 1 , with r 1 ≥ 0, r 1 A = −e(T 2 ), Y(r 1 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N , and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 1 it holds that λ k > 0 and u k satisfies
Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T 2 ). We show the decomposition by recursion. Suppose that for some a * ≥ 0 we have written y = a * k=1 λ k u k + r 1 , with r 1 ≥ 0, r 1 A = −e(T 2 ) and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * it holds that λ k > 0 and that u k satisfies (A1). Note that this certainly holds for a * = 0 and r 1 = y. Now if Y(r 1 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N , then we are done, so suppose that Y(r 1 )\{N } contains a partition, say U , of N . Define
• λ a * +1 = min{r 1 S : S ∈ U ∪ {N }}. Note that λ a * +1 > 0 and that Y(u a * +1 ) = U ∪ {N }. Observe, since U is a partition of N , that u a * +1 A = 0. Thus, u a * +1 satisfies (A1). Furthermore, by definition of λ a * +1 and u a * +1 it holds thatr 1 = r 1 − λ a * +1 u a * +1 ≥ 0. Finally, note, because u k A = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * + 1 and because yA = −e(T 2 ), thatr 1 A = yA − a * +1 k=1 λ k u k A = −e(T 2 ). So it now holds that y = a * +1 k=1 λ k u k +r 1 , withr 1 ≥ 0,r 1 A = −e(T 2 ), and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * +1 it holds that λ k > 0 and that u k satisfies (A1).
Observe that because of our choice of λ a * +1 it holds that Y(r 1 ) Y(r 1 ). This implies that in a finite number of steps we can decompose y into a 1 k=1 λ k u k + r 1 , with r 1 ≥ 0, r 1 A = −e(T 2 ), Y(r 1 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N , and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 1 it holds that λ k > 0 and that u k satisfies (A1). 2
Lemma A.5 Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T 2 ) and Y(y)\{N } does not contain a partition of N . Then we can decompose y into a 2 k=1 µ k w k + r 2 , with r 2 ≥ 0, r 2 N = 0, a 2 k=1 µ k ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 2 it holds that µ k > 0 and w k satisfies
Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T 2 ), and such that Y(y)\{N } does not contain a partition of N . We show the decomposition recursively. Suppose that for some a * ≥ 0 we have written y = a * k=1 µ k w k + r 2 , with r 2 ≥ 0, a * k=1 µ k ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * it holds that µ k > 0 and that w k satisfies (A2). Note that this certainly holds for a * = 0 and r 2 = y. If r 2 N = 0 then we are done, so suppose that r 2 N > 0. Observe that since Y(y)\{N } does not contain a partition of N , and since Y(r 2 ) ⊆ Y(y), it follows that Y(r 2 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N .
We will first show that a * k=1 µ k < 1 by contradiction. Suppose that a * k=1 µ k = 1. Then it follows, using yA = −e(T 2 ) and w k A = −e(T 2 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * , that r 2 A = yA − a * k=1 µ k w k A = (1 − a * k=1 µ k )(−e(T 2 )) = 0. Since r 2 N > 0, it follows that Y(r 2 )\{N } is a balanced collection of N . From Lemma A.3 we conclude that Y(r 2 )\{N } contains a partition of N . Since Y(r 2 ) ⊆ Y(y), it follows that Y(y)\{N } contains a partition of N . However, we assumed that this was not the case. Therefore we conclude that a * k=1 µ k < 1. Since r 2 A = (1− a * k=1 µ k )(−e(T 2 )) with a * k=1 µ k < 1, r N 2 > 0 and Y(r 2 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N , it follows that r 2 satisfies the conditions of Lemma A.7. According to Lemma A.7 Y(r 2 ) contains a partition U a * +1 of T 1 ∪ T 2 and a partition V a * +1 of
Note that µ a * +1 > 0. We will now show that w a * +1 A = −e(T 2 ). For each i ∈ T 2 there are unique S ∈ U a * +1 and T ∈ V a * +1 with i ∈ S and i ∈ T . Note that since U a * +1 ∩ V a * +1 = ∅, it holds that S = T . Furthermore, for each i ∈ T 1 \T 2 there is a unique S ∈ U a * +1 with i ∈ S and for each i ∈ T 3 \T 2 there is a unique T ∈ V a * +1 with i ∈ T . We conclude that w a * +1 A = −e(T 2 ). Since w a * +1 A = −e(T 2 ) we now observe that w a * +1 satisfies (A2). Also note thatr 2 = r 2 − µ a * +1 w a * +1 ≥ 0. We will now show by contradiction that it holds that a * +1 k=1 µ k ≤ 1. Suppose that a * +1 k=1 µ k > 1. Because a * k=1 µ k ≤ 1, it follows that there is a 0 ≤ d < µ a * +1 with a * k=1 µ k +d = 1. It trivially holds that y = a * k=1 µ k w k + dw a * +1 + (r 2 − dw a * +1 ). By definition of d it holds that (r 2 − dw a * +1 ) (r 2 − µ a * +1 w a * +1 ) ≥ 0. Since yA = −e(T 2 ), w k A = −e(T 2 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * + 1 and a * k=1 µ k + d = 1, it follows that (r 2 − dw a * +1 )A = 0. Because d < µ a * +1 , it holds that Y(r 2 − dw a * +1 ) = ∅. Therefore it follows that Y(r 2 − dw a * +1 )\{N } is a balanced collection. By Lemma A.3 it now follows that Y(r 2 − dw a * +1 )\{N } contains a partition of N . Since Y(r 2 − dw a * +1 ) ⊆ Y(r 2 ) it holds that Y(r 2 )\{N } contains a partition of N . This is clearly a contradiction to our initial assumption, so we conclude that a * +1 k=1 µ k ≤ 1. It follows that y = a * +1 k=1 µ k w k +r 2 , withr 2 ≥ 0, a * +1 k=1 µ k ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * + 1 it holds that µ k > 0 and w k satisfies (A2).
Observe that because of our choice of µ a * +1 it holds that Y(r 2 ) Y(r 2 ). This implies that in a finite number of steps we can decompose y into a 2 k=1 µ k w k + r 2 , with r 2 ≥ 0, r 2 N = 0, a 2 k=1 µ k ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 2 it holds that µ k > 0 and w k satisfies (A2). Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that y N = 0, and yA = d(−e(T 2 )) for some 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. We recursively show the decomposition. Suppose that for some a * ≥ 0 we have written y = a * k=1 ν k z k + r 3 , with a * k=1 ν k ≤ d, r 3 ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * it holds that ν k > 0 and that z k satisfies (A3). Note that this certainly holds for a * = 0 and r 3 = y. Now if a * k=1 ν k = d, then it follows, because yA = d(−e(T 2 )) and z k A = −e(T 2 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * , that r 3 A = yA − a * k=1 ν k z k A = 0. Because r 3 N = 0, r 3 ≥ 0 and because A has only non-positive entries in each row that does not correspond to N , we conclude that r 3 = 0. So y = a * k=1 ν k z k and we are done. Therefore suppose that a * k=1 ν k < d. Now r 3 A = yA − a * k=1 ν k z k A = (d − a * k=1 ν k )(−e(T 2 )), with d − a * k=1 ν k > 0. Since r 3 N = 0, and because in A the only row with positive entries is the row corresponding to N , this means that r 3 S = 0 for all S ∈ T ∪ {T * , N } with S ⊆ T 2 . This implies that Y(r 3 ) is a balanced collection on T 2 . From Lemma A.3 it follows that Y(r 3 ) contains a partition of T 2 . Now let U be such a partition. Define
Note that ν a * +1 > 0. Since z a * +1 A = −e(T 2 ), it follows that z a * +1 satisfies (A3). Also observe that by definition of ν a * +1 and z a * +1 it holds thatr 3 ≥ 0. It remains to show that a * +1 k=1 ν k ≤ d. Suppose that a * +1 k=1 ν k > d. Then it follows thatr 3 
k=1 ν k < 0. Hence,r 3 A = f e(T 2 ) for some f > 0. However, this is impossible, sincer 3 ≥ 0, r 3 N = 0 and because A contains only non-positive entries in the rows not corresponding to N . Therefore we obtain that a * +1 k=1 ν k ≤ d. Hence, we have that y = a * +1 k=1 ν k z k +r 3 , with a * +1 k=1 ν k ≤ d,r 3 ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a * + 1 it holds that ν k > 0 and that z k satisfies (A3).
Observe that by definition of ν a * +1 and z a * +1 it holds that Y(r 3 ) Y(r 3 ). Hence, in a finite number of steps we obtain that y = a 3 k=1 ν k z k , where ν k > 0 and z k satisfies (A3) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 3 . Since yA = d(−e(T 2 )) and that z k A = −e(T 2 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a 3 it follows that a 3 k=1 ν k = d. 2
Lemma A.7 Let r 2 ≥ 0 be such that r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) for some 0 < f ≤ 1, r N 2 > 0 and Y(r 2 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N . Then Y(r 2 ) contains a partition U of T 1 ∪ T 2 and a partition V of T 2 ∪ T 3 with U ∩ V = ∅.
Proof: We will show how to obtain a partition of T 1 ∪ T 2 . Analogously one can find a partition of T 2 ∪ T 3 . First we will show that we can find disjoint elements S k ∈ Y(r 2 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ q, such that (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) ⊆ ∪ q k=1 S k . We will do this by giving a recursive argument. Because r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) for some 0 < f ≤ 1 and 1 ∈ T 2 , it holds that S∈T ∪{T * }:1∈S r 2 S = r 2 N . By assumption r 2 N > 0 and we conclude that S∈T ∪{T * }:1∈S r 2 S > 0. Hence, there exists an S 1 ∈ Y(r 2 ), with 1 ∈ S 1 . Now suppose that we have selected disjoint S k ∈ Y(r 2 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ t, such that N \(∪ t k=1 S k ) = {b, . . . , n} for some b ∈ N . Or in other words, suppose that ∪ t k=1 S k is a head of σ 0 . Note that t = 1 and S 1 satisfy this property.
If b ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 , then we are done, so suppose that b ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 . According to Lemma A.8, with a = b, it holds that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:b∈S r 2 S ≥ S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:b−1∈S r 2 S . Since for S t it holds that b − 1 ∈ S t , b ∈ S t and r 2 St > 0, it follows that there is an S t+1 ∈ Y(r 2 ) with b − 1 ∈ S t+1 , b ∈ S t+1 and r 2 S t+1 > 0. We conclude that N \ ∪ t+1 k=1 S k = {c, . . . , n} with c > b. By recursion we obtain disjoint S k ∈ Y(r 2 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ q, with (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) ⊆ ∪ q k=1 S k . We will now show that (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) = ∪ q k=1 S k by contradiction. Suppose that (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) ∪ q k=1 S k . Then N \(∪ q k=1 S k ) = {b, . . . , n} for some b ∈ T 3 \T 2 with b − 1 ∈ T 3 \T 2 . According to Lemma A.8, with a = b it follows that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:b∈S r 2 S = S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:b−1∈S r 2 S . Since for S q it holds that b − 1 ∈ S q , b ∈ S q and r 2 Sq > 0, it follows that there is an S q+1 ∈ Y(r 2 )\{N } with b − 1 ∈ S q+1 , b ∈ S q and r 2 S q+1 > 0. Note that N \ ∪ q+1 k=1 S k = {c, . . . , n} with c > b. By recursion we therefore obtain a partition of N . However, initially we assumed that Y(r 2 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N . From this contradiction we conclude that (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) = ∪ q k=1 S k . Now let U = {S 1 , . . . , S q } ⊆ Y(r 2 ) be a partition of T 1 ∪ T 2 and V = {R 1 , . . . , R m } ⊆ Y(r 2 ) a partition of T 2 ∪ T 3 . If U ∩ V = ∅, then S i = R j for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Hence, {S 1 , . . . , S i , R j+1 , . . . , R m } is a partition of N . This contradicts the assumption that Y(r 2 ) \ {N } does not contain a partition of N . We conclude that U ∩ V = ∅.
Lemma A.8 Let r 2 ≥ 0 be such that r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) for some 0 < f ≤ 1. Then it holds for all a ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 with a > 1, that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a∈S r 2 S ≥ S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a−1∈S r 2 S . Furthermore it holds for all a, a + 1 ∈ T 3 \T 2 that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a+1∈S r 2 S = S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a∈S r 2 S .
Proof: Let r 2 ≥ 0 be such that r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) for some 0 < f ≤ 1. Let a ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 with a > 1.
If a ∈ T 1 \T 2 , then it follows that a − 1 ∈ T 1 \T 2 . It follows from r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a∈S
If a ∈ T 2 and a − 1 ∈ T 1 \T 2 , then it follows from r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) that Similarly it can be shown that for all a, a + 1 ∈ T 3 \T 2 that S∈Y(r 2 )\{N }:a+1∈S
Lemma A.9 Let r 2 ≥ 0 be such that r 2 A = f (−e(T 2 )) for some 0 < f ≤ 1, r 2 N > 0 and Y(r 2 )\{N } does not contain a partition of N . Consider a partition V k ⊆ Y(r 2 )\{N } of T 2 ∪ T 3 and letV k = {T ∈ V k : T ⊆ T 2 }. ThenV k = ∅ and V k \V k = ∅. Furthermore it holds that T ∩ T 1 = ∅ for all T ∈V k and that there is a T ∈V k with T ∩ T 2 = ∅.
Proof: Observe that from Lemma A.7 it follows that a partition V k of T 2 ∪ T 3 exists. Note that V k = ∅, since V k is a partition of T 2 ∪ T 3 and T 3 = ∅.
We will now show that for all T ∈V k it holds that T 1 ∩ T = ∅ by contradiction. Suppose that there is a T ∈V k with T 1 ∩ T = ∅. Since T ∈V k it follows that T ⊆ T 2 . That is, there is a j ∈ T with j ∈ T 3 \T 2 . Since T is connected it follows that T * T . This is a contradiction since the coalitions containing T * are not in T and therefore also not in Y(r 2 )\{N }. Hence it holds for all T ∈V k that T ∩ T 1 = ∅. Because T 1 ∩ T 2 = ∅, there is an S ∈ V k with S ∩ T 1 = ∅. This implies that S ∈V k and hence that V k =V k . Finally, we prove that there is a T ∈V k with T ∩ T 2 = ∅. Suppose that for all T ∈V k it holds that T ∩ T 2 = ∅. According to Lemma A.7 there is a partition U k of T 1 ∪ T 2 . This implies that U k ∪V k forms a partition of N , which is a contradiction to our initial assumption.
